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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a consensus today among torts scholars concerning three
propositions. First, it is agreed that American tort law has been shaped during
the past three decades by the theory of enterprise liability. The strict products
liability "revolution" is the most conspicuous example of the judicial
implementation of this theory, but it is widely recognized that "the contours of
modem tort law reflect a single coherent conception ... which its proponents
called the theory of enterprise liability .... ." Central to that theory are the
policies of victim compensation and loss spreading. 2 It is also agreed by most
scholars that the enterprise liability revolution has been a failure and that the
"use of tort law as a device for expanding insurance protection against
disabling injuries is... questionable." 3 Finally, although some may dissent, it
is widely believed that economic analysis, focused on "liability incentives for
the prevention of future injuries," is "the generally prevailing theory about the
appropriate role of tort law." 4
In this Article we argue that these widely held beliefs are profoundly
flawed. Scholars who hold these beliefs misunderstand the theory of enterprise
liability, inappropriately inflate the importance of economic analysis, and fail to
understand the relationship between the enterprise liability theory and economic
analysis. Moreover, the consequences of these misunderstandings transcend
academic debates about tort "theory." These misunderstandings impede the
development of a personal injury law that many of those who share these
misunderstandings would applaud.
In Part II of this Article we set out the theory of enterprise liability as it
was understood and articulated by its proponents. We demonstrate that,
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I George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,463 (1985).
2 See id. at 470-71. For a compilation of decisions utilizing the loss spreading
rationale, see Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
229, 302 n.470 (1981).
3 1 REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE REsPoNSiBiLrrY FOR PERSONAL flOURY 30
(American Law Institute, 1991) [hereinafter 1 REPORTERs' STUDY].
4 Id. at 31-32; see generally WiLLIAM M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEvEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAw (1987).
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contrary to popular perception, strict products liability is merely one fragment
of that theory, which also encompassed no-fault compensation plans and
damages reform. Indeed, the no-fault idea and its application to the automobile
and other accident settings were central features of enterprise liability
scholarship from the late 1920s through the early 1970s. Thus it is ironic that
scholars today mistakenly see no-fault as an alternative to a failed "enterprise
liability" theory now seen as synonymous with strict products liability (and
traditional damages rules). In Part HI, we explain how the no-fault and damages
reform aspects of the enterprise liability theory became obscured to the point
that contemporary scholars could so misunderstand that theory.
In Part M we analyze the relationship of the enterprise liability theory to
the economic analysis of tort law, a theoretical approach that came to
prominence in the early 1970s-at the very time that the enterprise liability
theory began its descent into obscurity. Ironically, the initial appeal of
economic analysis derived from the appearance that it was supportive of the no-
fault and strict liability agenda of the enterprise liability theory. As presented in
the pioneering work of Guido Calabresi, economic analysis promised to
provide a sophisticated new argument for the "nonfault" enterprise liability
agenda.5 Calabresi, however, expressly sought to distance that agenda from the
"radical" loss spreading policy, substituting in its place the goal of efficient
prevention of accidents. 6 He confidently wrote that his "modified enterprise
liability approach.., would give us better ... deterrence than fault and as
much compensation as we want." 7
In fact, Calabresi's confidence was misplaced. During the 1970s it became
increasingly clear, largely through the scholarship of Richard Posner, that the
economic analysis that Calabresi popularized could not support the substantive
agenda he favored. The efficiency goal, it turned out, is at best agnostic and at
worst antagonistic toward the nonfault agenda that Calabresi (and the
unmodified enterprise liability theory) favored.8 By the end of the 1970s,
economic analysis, now mostly deployed in defense of the fault system, was
seen by many to be the dominant theory about the appropriate role of tort law,
an achievement facilitated by Calabresi's downplaying of the enterprise liability
goals of victim compensation and loss spreading as well as by the obscurity
into which central tenets of that theory had fallen.
In Part IV, we assess the place of a properly understood (unmodified)
5 Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965) [hereinafter 77w Decision]; see also Guido Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J 499 (1961)
[hereinafter Some Thoughts].
6 See The Decision, supra note 5, at 745.
7 1d.
8 See Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 205, 221
(1973); see also Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14
J. LEGAL STuD. 585, 626 (1985) (need for empirically based reexamination); 1 REPORTERS'
STUDY, supra note 3, at 263 ("efficient incentives for accident avoidance flow from either
[strict liability or negligence] standards").
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enterprise liability theory (encompassing both damages reform and no-fault
principles) in contemporary tort theory. We point out that the perceived
dominance of economic analysis is due to the relegation of no-fault to the realm
of "alternatives to tort," thus beyond the domain of "tort" theory. 9 In recent
years, however, no-fault proposals have drawn support across a broad
scholarly and ideological spectrum. 10 Thus, once one recognizes no-fault as an
aspect of a broader tort theory, the central position of the enterprise liability
theory in modem tort law becomes clear. That recognition also opens up the
possibility the courts can be a vehicle (perhaps the only viable vehicle, given
the demonstrated power of special interests to paralyze the legislative process)
to achieve the "promising blend of efficient compensation, economical
administration, and effective prevention"" that is the hallmark of the properly
understood enterprise liability theory.
We conclude this Article, in Part V, with concrete proposals, suitable for
judicial implementation, that incorporate no-fault ideas to avoid problematic
aspects of the strict products liability form of the enterprise liability theory-
namely, the defect requirement and traditional damages rules. We demonstrate
that bourts, operating within the framework of our common law tradition, can
create a tort law suitable for the twenty-first century.
H. ENTERPRISE LIABILrrY
A. The Theoty and Its Successes
Torts scholars are correct in their belief that strict products liability and
other expansive tort developments of recent years derive from the enterprise
liability theory. Their mistake is that they fail to recognize that these
developments are merely one facet of that theory. The consequence of this
failure of understanding is that the picture of the enterprise liability theory
presented by torts scholars is, in fact, a caricature and a distortion of the theory
of enterprise liability as understood and articulated by its proponents.
Although most scholars today appear unaware of the fact, compensation
plans formed the centerpiece of early enterprise liability scholarship. Inspired
by the enactment of workers' compensation plans, scholars such as Leon Green
and Fleming James saw the evolution of employee accident law as "a pattern
by which to indicate other developments either mature or now under way." 12
9 See, e.g., 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3, at 35 (no-fault as "alternative to
tort").
10 As discussed, infra Part IV, supporters include Stephen Sugarman (tort critic
favoring social insurance), Gary Schwartz (previously sympathetic to negligence system),
Peter Huber (tort critic favoring contract alternatives), and the 1991 ALl Reporters' Study
(medical no-fault proposal). See 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3.
11 2 REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILTrY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 534
(American Law Institute, 1991) [hereinafter 2 REPORTERS' STUDY].
12 Leon Green, 7he Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 1I, The Moral, Economic,
Preventative and Justice Factors, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 270 (1929); see also VoNiGNA
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For these scholars, the goal was to create "a more comprehensive and more
adequate means of protection for all victims of personal injuries... without
placing too heavy a burden on enterprise or any other segment of the social
group." 13 To achieve this goal, they thus sought to supplant tort law and its
requirement that victims prove negligence with legislatively enacted
compensation plans tailored to discrete categories of accidents. Green, in 1929,
for example, proposed compensation plans for railroad crossing accidents, 14 for
children injured while trespassing on industrial premises, 15 and for automobile
accidents.' 6 The latter proposal foreshadowed the landmark 1932 Colunbia
Study, which concurred that tort law should be displaced in automobile accident
cases. 17
Only after it became clear that automobile compensation plan proposals had
foundered on the legislative seas of special interest politics did enterprise
liability advocates look seriously to courts and the common law to achieve their
goal of victim compensation. It was not until the mid-1950s, for example, that
James recognized the potential of strict products liability to achieve that goal.' 8
In his previous scholarship, 19 James had appeared unaware of the potential of
the strict products liability doctrine proposed by Justice Roger Traynor in his
now famous 1944 concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.20
Recognizing this potential in the mid-1950s, James enthusiastically endorsed
the form of "strict enterprise liability" 21 that courts would soon embrace in
products liability cases in the early 1960s. The 1960s also saw a major advance
on the automobile compensation plan front with the 1965 publication of Robert
Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell's Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim.22 That
E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT
REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21-68 (1995).
13 Leon Green, 7he Individual's Protection Under Negligence Law: Risk Shaiing, 47
Nw. U. L. REv. 751, 775 (1953).
14 See Green, supra note 12, at 275-76.
15 See id. at 272-74.
16 See id. at 277-79.
17 See COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT
TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1932).
18 See Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 192 (1955).
19 See Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability: Some Warinme Developments, 55 YALE
L.J 365 (1946).
20 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, I., concurring); see also Trust v. Arden
Farms Co., 324 P.2d 583, 595 (Cal. 1958) (rraynor, I., concurring and dissenting) (strict
liability for harm caused by food containers); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 203 P.2d 522,
532 (Cal. 1949) (Traynor, J., concurring) (reiterating his Escola proposal).
21 Fleming James, Jr., General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1957).
2 2 ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICrIM: A BLUEPRINr FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). For other
important works focusing on the problem of the automobile accident, see ALFRED F.
CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964); Clarence Morris & James C. N. Paul, The
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work built on previous enterprise liability scholarship and found success with
the flurry of legislative enactments of no-fault plans in the early 1970s.
Strict products liability and no-fault compensation plans, thus. are aspects
of a broader enterprise liability theory, and they were recognized as such by
their proponents. For example, James, the leading academic advocate of the
application of "strict enterprise liability" in products cases, 23 hailed the
automobile no-fault compensation plan proposed by Keeton and O'Connell as a
promising new "statutory system[] of enterprise liability." 24 O'Connell
similarly recognized auto no-fault and his own proposed extensions of no-fault
insurance beyond auto accidents as a "form of tort liability called 'enterpriseliability*.1"25
Given the compensation plan origins of the enterprise liability theory, it
should come as no surprise that damages reform was also an important
(although today overlooked) aspect of that theory. Indeed, as enterprise liability
proponents during the 1950s increasingly turned their focus from compensation
plans to the common law, they also questioned the traditional c~mmon law
damages award. The issue of damages reform was first raised in 1951 by
Albert Ehrenzweig in the book in which he coined the term "enterprise
liability." 26 Shortly thereafter, in 1953, Louis Jaffe spelled out in detail the
damages implications of the movement toward liability based "on insurability
rather than notions of fault." 27 Jaffe questioned both the collateral source rule
and the award of damages for pain and suffering. 28 He also hinted at a
provocative role for courts in damages reform, suggesting that "the award for
pain and suffering might be measured and justified in terms of a contribution to
the real costs of the litigation [that is, attorneys' fees]." 2 9 Jaffe's damages
reform thesis quickly gained acceptance among enterprise liability scholars,
including Green, 30 Traynor, 31 and James, 32 thus firmly establishing by the
Financial Impact ofAutomobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962).
23 See Priest, supra note 1, at 465.
24 See Fleming James, Jr., The Future of Negligence in Accident Law, 53 VA. L. REv.
911, 916-17 (1967) (referring to KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 22).
25 Jeffrey O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59
VA. L. REV. 749, 773 (1973) [hereinafter Expanding]; see also JEFFREY O'CoNNELL,
ENDING INSULT TO INIURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERvICES (1975)
[hereinafter INnJRY].
26 See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951), reprinted in 54
CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1423 (1966) [hereinafter cited to CAL. L. REV.].
27 Louis L. Jaffe, Daraages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoBS. 219, 221 (1953).
28 See id.
2 9 Id. at 235.
3 0 See LEON GREEN, TRAFFC VICM: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958).
31 See Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 344 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor,
I., dissenting).32 See Fleming James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 584-
85 (1956); see also FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMNG JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25
(1956).
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early 1960s that damages reform is a central aspect of the enterprise liability
theory. That theme, of course, is congruent with the approach of no-fault
compensation plans, which provide for assured, but limited, compensation.
Not surprisingly, therefore, O'Connell picked up the damages reform
theme in the late 1970s and early 1980s, proposing, among other things, the
elimination of pain and suffering damages in return for a rule requiring a losing
defendant to pay a victim's attorneys' fees and other costs of prosecuting the
claim.33 Furthermore, O'Connell argued that this and his other reforms could
be implemented by common law decision.34
The theory of enterprise liability is thus far more nuanced and complex
than is recognized by contemporary critics who depict its proponents as
scholars who with "radical single-mindedness ... promoted one principle-
risk distribution-land] ruthlessly devalued or ignored... [e]very other
consideration that might be thought relevant to the resolution of a tort
dispute." 35 The widely accepted caricature of scholars indifferent to concerns
of cost and efficiency is flatly incorrect. For enterprise liability scholars, the
goal was to achieve the sort of balanced reform embodied in workers'
compensation plans-to extend the workers' compensation pattern to other
accident settings both by legislative compensation plans and by judicially
created tort doctrine. Their goal, as James wrote in 1959, was to "produce a
prompt, widespread, and, above all, equitable distribution of payments in
accident cases." 36
B. The Fragmentation of the Enterprise Liability Theory
With courts adopting and implementing strict products liability and no-fault
auto insurance sweeping across the country, the enterprise liability theory
dominated tort law during the 1960s and early 1970s. During these very years,
however, the economic analysis of law began to emerge, and by the late 1970s
economic efficiency and the prevention of injuries were seen as the proper
goals of tort law. How economic analysis came to dominate tort theory is an
important question whose answer will have important implications.
Ironically, the successes of the no-fault movement in the early 1970s paved
the way for the embrace of economic analysis by torts scholars. The rapid
legislative successes of no-fault auto insurance during this period produced a
wave of optimism, much like the mood following the enactment of workers'
33 See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative Fault,
with Compensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule, 1979 U. ILL.
L.F. 591 [hereinafter Compensatory]; Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants'
Payment for Pain and Suffeting in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981
U. ILL. L. REV. 333 [hereinafter Payment].
34 Compensatory, supra note 33, at 605, see also Expanding, supra note 25, at 790
n.118, 825.
35 Priest, supra note 1, at 470.
3 6 Fleming James, Jr., The Colunbia Study of Compensationfor Automobile Accidents:
An Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLuM. L. REv. 408, 424 (1959).
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compensation legislation, about the prospects for legislative reform and an
examination of new areas in which tort law might be displaced by
compensation plans. As the 1970s unfolded, Jeffrey O'Connell carried on the
enterprise liability tradition. In 1973, for example, he proclaimed that "[n]o-
fault auto insurance seems to have come of age. If so, no army of trial
attorneys or timid insurance executives will be able to halt its progress." 37
Accordingly, he urged that it was time to turn "to more ambitious legislation,
... time we turned away from the tortuous 'interstitial legislation' of the
common law tort system." 38
Scholars who favored the enterprise liability goal of victim compensation
did shift their focus from the "interstitial legislation" of the common law to
proposals for more sweeping legislative change in the form of no-fault
compensation plans. This shift in focus away from the common law to the
compensation plan version of enterprise liability during the 1970s had an
important consequence. The enterprise liability theory first became fragmented
and then, ultimately, lost its identity as a tort theory among torts scholars. In
his 1973 proposal for expanding no-fault compensation beyond automobile
insurance, O'Connell had forthrightly recognized that he was "creating a new
form of tort liability called 'enterprise liability,'" 39 but the authors of later
compensation plan proposals discarded that label. No-fault took on a life of its
own and was no longer recognized as one aspect of the broader enterprise
liability theory. In his 1979 book, The Lawsuit Lottery, for example, O'Connell
proposed a system of elective first-party no-fault insurance but no longer linked
no-fault to enterprise liability. 40 Indeed, the term "enterprise liability" is not
mentioned in the book.41
The delinking of the compensation plan idea from the broader enterprise
liability theory eventually had the important consequence of removing
compensation plans from the realm of tort theory. No-fault came to be seen as
an alternative to "tort," not as a theory about the proper configuration of tort
(personal injury) law. 42 Moreover, as no-fault scholars criticized the tort law
that their compensation plans were designed to replace, their analyses further
obscured the enterprise liability theory. In 1973, Jeffrey O'Connell had
succinctly reviewed the enterprise liability critique of the fault system. These
criticisms included the "difficulties of establishing the fault of a defendant," the
barrier of contributory fault, the "collateral source rule, which calls for
... multiple payment," awards "for so-called pain and suffering ... with the
... result that those suffering pain the least are paid for it the most," and the
overall indictment of a system that "squanders insurance dollars" because of
37 Expanifng, supra note 25, at 749; see also INJuRY, supra note 25.
3 8 Expanding, supra note 25, at 771; see also INJmURY, supra note 25.
39 Expanding, supra note 25, at 773.
40 See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAwsurr LorTEY 187 (1979).
41 See id at 262.
42 See, e.g., 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3, at 35 (no-fault as "alternative to
tort").
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high administrative costs. 43 Although O'Connell expressly recognized that
judicial lawmaking might remedy these flaws, later no-fault critiques by others
failed to recognize the possibility of a common law remedy and assumed that
"tort" law was "stuck with the administrative apparatus of [traditional] tort law
[including its] rules of damages."44 Indeed, no-fault insurance proponents
railed against "tort" law without differentiating between traditional tort law (the
proper villain) and the enterprise liability vision of tort law (which shared with
compensation plans the goal of assured adequate compensation).
One consequence of these developments was that the enterprise liability
critique of traditional tort law and damages rules was transformed into a
critique of the enterprise liability view that the main goal of tort law should be
assurance of adequate compensation. Scholars ignored the common law version
of enterprise liability, especially its damages reform agenda, and commonly
believed that "tort" law necessarily possessed "considerable flaws ... as a
device for expanding insurance protection against disabling injuries," 45 despite
the fact that these flaws were those of traditional tort law, not the enterprise
liability alternative. By the late 1970s, it was widely believed that "the use of
tort law as a device for expanding insurance protection against disabling
injuries is ... a questionable enterprise." 46 By then, the enterprise liability
theory had become so obscured that it had virtually ceased to exist in the minds
of tort scholars. 47
During the period of the fragmentation (and obscuring) of the enterprise
liability theory, economic analysis entered into the ongoing fray between the
43 Expanding, supra note 25, at 758-59.
44 STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INURY LAw 36 (1989); see
also 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3, at 30.
45 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3, at 29-30; see also Gary T. Schwartz, The
Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 313, 316
(1990).
46 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3, at 30.
47 Ile "disappearance" of the enterprise liability theory can be seen in treatments of
tort history that appeared in the early 1980s. For example, the term "enterprise liability" is
not even listed in the index to G. Edward White's excellent book on tort history. See G.
EDWARD WHrrE, TORT LAWiN AMERICA: AN INTELLECruAL HISTORY 279-83 (1980). Other
scholars either failed to recognize the common law agenda of the enterprise liability
scholars or lumped it together with "traditional tort scholarship-primarily concerned with
the coherence and the clarification of tort doctrine." Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Tort
Scholarship, 73 CAL. L. REv. 548, 548 (1985). Compensation plans, now seen as a
legislative repudiation of tort, were either ignored in tort histories or treated largely as a
product of the 1960s and the Keeton-O'Connell plan. O'Connell writes, for example, that
"nowhere in Professor White's book [Tort Law in America] does he discuss workers'
compensation... -like many torts scholars [he] completely ignores it." Jeffrey O'Connell,
Book Review, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1208. Absent in these accounts was the unified theory
of enterprise liability that, dating from Leon Green's seminal work in the 1920s, had
challenged and defeated traditional tort theory, conceived and nurtured the compensation
plan idea, provided the framework for the Keeton-O'Connell plan, and dominated personal
injury law since the early 1960s.
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scholars who favored the negligence system and those (enterprise liability)
scholars who favored alternatives that better served the goal of assured
adequate compensation. It should be emphasized at this point that despite the
successes of the enterprise liability theory, it remained a very controversial way
of looking at tort law, capable of generating strident opposition among scholars
who clung to the traditional view that compensation should be linked to fault.
These scholars cringed at the "specter of runaway social engineering with ill-
considered emphasis on risk-spreading capacity," 48 and they resisted "a sharp
change in our system of compensation of accidental injuries, shifting from our
present system with its premise of liability based on fault to a system based on
a premise of loss distribution or insurance." 49
Even as courts moved to adopt the strict products liability version of the
enterprise liability theory, many-if not most-scholars remained
uncomfortable with its radical implications. William Prosser, for example, was
considered the repository of consensus thought in tort scholarship during the
1960s, 50 "serv[ing] as a litmus paper test of the permissible range of scholarly
dispute." 51 Yet he characterized the major themes of enterprise liability as "too
radical and disruptive" for implementation. 52
The fact remained, however, that the premise of both strict products
liability and the no-fault movement was that of the enterprise liability
scholars-the assurance of adequate compensation to the victims of accidental
injury. The rejection by courts and legislatures of the traditional view that
linked liability to fault thus created a void in tort theory and placed scholars in
a dilemma. If they opposed the radical implications of the loss spreading
policy, how could that opposition be justified on other than "political"
grounds? For a new generation of scholars, the answer to this question lay in a
new approach to tort theory that emerged just as the enterprise liability theory
assumed the center stage of tort scholarship in 1960. That approach was the
economic analysis of law.
48 Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. Rav. 401,
444 (1959).
4 9 Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 463,
508 (1962).
5 0 See WHrrE, supra note 47, at 155.
51 Id. at 163--64.
52 William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Otadel (Strict Liability to the Constmner),
69 YALELJ. 1099, 1120 (1960).
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III. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW
A. The Emergence of (Calabresi's) Economic Analysis as an "Ally" of
Enterprise Liability
The economic analysis of tort law can be traced to the 1961 publication of
Guido Calabresi's first tort article, 53 which appeared almost simultaneously
with Ronald Coase's famous article, The Problem of Social Cost.5 4 Calabresi
began by stating his agreement with the statement in the recently published
Gregory and Kalven torts casebook that "the central policy issue in tort law is
whether the principal criterion of liability is to be based on individual fault or
on a wide distribution of risk and loss." 55 Rather than take sides in this debate
between traditional tort theory and enterprise liability, Calabresi offered an
economic theory of tort law that was an alternative to both of these approaches.
Economic analysis thus promised to fill the void created by the defeat of
traditional tort theory, offering an alternative to the enterprise liability theory
and its loss spreading premise.
Calabresi's economic analysis could be seen as a more sophisticated
version of enterprise liability or, at least, as a closely allied theory of tort law.
Indeed, in his early work Calabresi used the term "enterprise liability" to
describe his own theory.56 In addition, Calabresi explained and elaborated on
the enterprise liability view of the desirability of loss spreading. 57 From the
outset of his career, however, Calabresi sought to develop a theory distinct
from that of the enterprise liability scholars, who, as Calabresi recognized, had
"been concerned primarily with risk spreading." 58 Thus, in his 1961 article,
Calabresi wrote that he was "less concerned with the risk spreading potential of
enterprise liability than with whether another, more general, justification exists
for the 'should' in the phrase 'an enterprise should bear its costs.'" 5 9 For
Calabresi, that more general justification was provided by economic theory.
Calabresi's economic theory could be seen to situate him as an ally of the
enterprise liability scholars, however, since it supported their strict liability and
compensation plan agenda.
For Calabresi, the more general justification for allocating accident costs to
enterprises was the "'allocation of resources' justification." 60 According to
53 Some Thoughts, supra note 5.
54 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960); see also
Guido Calabresi, Commentary, in Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Oted Articles from The Yale
Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1482 n. 108 (1991).
55 Some Thoughts, supra note 5, at 499 (quoting CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HARRY
KALvEN, JR., CASES AND MATERiALS ON TORTS 689 (1959)).
56 See id. at 518.
57See id. at 517-19.
5 8 Id. at 530 (citing FowLmi V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS
1370-74 (1956)).
59 Id. at 501.
6 0 Id. at 501-02 (footnote omitted).
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Calabresi, "the most desirable system of loss distribution under a strict
resource-allocation theory is one in which the prices of goods accurately reflect
their full cost to society." 61 To him this meant that we should move away from
fault-based liability rules, that "the cost of injuries should be borne by the
activities which caused them, whether or not fault is involved, because, either
way, the injury is a real cost of those activities." 62
In subsequent articles in the 1960s and in The Costs of Accidents,63
Calabresi elaborated on this resource allocation rationale, which evolved into a
theory of "'general deterrence'... as a guide to allocation of losses."64 Under
this approach, accident costs would be diminished "not by directly attacking
specific occasions of danger, but (like workmen's compensation) by making
more expensive those activities which are accident prone and thereby making
more attractive their safer substitutes." 65 Calabresi utilized this theoretical
approach during the 1960s to suggest a framework for nonfault liability that
supported automobile compensation plans. 66 In a 1972 article, written with Jon
T. Hirschoff, he deployed his economic analysis to support the emerging
doctrine of strict products liability and to describe "a framework [for] defining
the limits of strict liability in the areas of the law where it has come to
dominate." 67 In this article, Calabresi argued that courts should impose liability
on the party to an accident that was "in the best position to make the cost-
benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act
on that decision once it is made."68 In his view, this approach would be more
likely than the negligence test "to accomplish a satisfactory job of ... accident
cost optimization. "69
Because of Calabresi's early use of the rhetoric of enterprise liability and
his advocacy of nonfault liability rules, it was easy for scholars initially to view
economic analysis as allied with the enterprise liability theory. In the 1968
supplement to the Harper and James treatise, for example, James saw
Calabresi's theory, which "stress[ed] the need to have an enterprise pay its own
accident costs in order to assure the proper allocation of limited resources, [as
having] collateral advantages. It will tend to assure compensation for traffic
victims and it will bring about a wide distribution of the costs of accidents." 70
61 Id. at 505.
62 Id.
63 GuIDO CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTs: A LEGAL AND EcoNoMIc ANALYsIs
54 (student ed. 1970).
64 Guido Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wondeufid World of BIwn and Kalven, 75
YALE LJ. 216, 223 (1965).
65 Id.
66 See CALABRBsi, supra note 63, at313-18; see also The Decision, supra note 5.
67 Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1084 (1972); see also Fred R. Shapiro, supra note 54, at 1501 (Calabresi
discussing Calabresi & Hirsohoff, supra).
68 Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 67, at 1060 (emphasis omitted).
69 Id. at 1059.
70 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 4-5 (Supp. 1968) (quoting Fleming James, Jr.,
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Similarly, in 1973, O'Connell wrote of "Calabresi's alluring idea that market
deterrence is the best way for accident law to 'reduce the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.'" 71 For O'Connell, "resource
allocation [was] another justification for imposing no-fault liability on an
enterprise." 72 For such scholars, Calabresi's analysis was appealing because it
provided a sophisticated new argument in support of the enterprise liability
agenda.
B. The Antagonism Between Calabresi's Economic Analysis and
Enterprise Liability
Calabresi's economic analysis, however, was offered as an alternative to
the enterprise liability theory, and from the outset there was a fundamental
antagonism between the two approaches. Indeed, Calabresi expressly rejected
the view of "writers [with a footnote to Harper and James] who have been
concerned primarily with risk spreading [and] have tended to view enterprise
liability as, at best, a half way house on the road to social insurance." 73
Although he aligned himself with the compensation plan agenda of the
enterprise liability scholars, Calabresi wrote that he proposed a "modified
enterprise liability approach." 74 As Walter Blum and Harry Kalven noted at the
time, Calabresi's "modified enterprise liability" was an explicit blend of
"policy judgments [and] political predictions." 75 Calabresi wrote that "we are
faced with the fact that a time-honored system (fault) fails to satisfy a modem
demand (compensation)." 76 He characterized the debate as one between
"'conservative' and 'radical' camps," 77 and he expressly rejected the views of
both traditional tort theorists and the "radical" enterprise liability scholars who
had urged that "compensation [is] the main purpose of accident law." 78
Instead, Calabresi sought a "middle ground." 79
In Calabresi's view, the fault system was "so unpalatable on compensation
grounds that it would soon be replaced." 80 He feared that the "politically
unstable" fault system would be replaced not by compensation plans but "by
Book Review, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 297, 302-03).
71 Expanding, supra note 25, at 766-67 (quoting CALABRESl, supra note 63, at 26).
72 Id. at 778; see also Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis. An Analysis and a
Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 439, 462 (1972).
73 Some Thoughts, supra note 5, at 530.
74 The Decision, supra note 5, at 745.
75 Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi-Auto
Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CM. L. REV. 239, 272 n.74 (1967).
76 The Decision, supra note 5, at 745.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 715.
79 See id. at 745.
80 Id. at 744; see also Blum & Kalven, supra note 75, at 243; Guido Calabresi, Views
and Overviews, 1967 U. ITL. L.F. 600, 610-11.
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social insurance in order to accomplish compensation." 81 Guided by these
political judgments, Calabresi presented his "modified enterprise liability,"
which severed the compensation plan idea from its compensation and loss
spreading premise and replaced that premise with the theory of general
deterrence. In Calabresi's view, the goal of victim compensation was dangerous
because "if compensation were the only goal, then by far the most effective and
efficient method of accomplishing it would be through a system of general
social insurance."82 Such a system was undesirable, however, because it
"would externalize the cost of accidents" and thus negate the goal of general
deterrence.83 Calabresi also believed that the compensation goal was
superfluous because economic theory supported the displacement of traditional
tort law with nonfault approaches in the form of compensation plans and strict
liability. He was confident that his "modified enterprise liability approach
... would give us better general deterrence than fault [or social insurance] and
as much compensation as we want," 84 while also derailing what he saw as a
movement toward social insurance.85
Turning his attention to strict products liability in the 1970s, Calabresi
argued that "the recent move to strict liability in torts could not be explained
predominantly on ... spreading grounds, as was commonly stated, but was
likely to stem from dissatisfaction with the meager accomplishments of fault
type tests in reducing the sum of accident and safety costs."86 He also
questioned the "wisdom" and propriety of courts' utilizing the loss spreading
policy, writing that, even if loss spreading considerations were sound as a
matter of social policy and thus appropriate for legislative implementation, "it
does not follow that [they] are equally suited to being considered by courts or
juries."87 Thus, for Calabresi, the loss spreading policy was dangerous and
superfluous, had not been the policy underlying strict products liability, and
was of questionable propriety for judicial implementation.
Calabresi's rejection of the enterprise liability view that "compensation [is]
the main purpose of accident law"88 coincided with the previously discussed
rejection by compensation plan advocates of compensation as a goal of "tort"
law. Those scholars, it will be recalled, mistakenly equated tort law with
traditional tort law and ignored the possibility of common law routes to the no-
fault (enterprise liability) goal of assured adequate compensation. 89 For his
part, Calabresi mistakenly transformed the enterprise liability view that
compensation is the main purpose of accident law into the observation that "if
compensation were the only goal, then by far the most effective and efficient
81 The Decision, supra note 5, at 744.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 745.
85 See a
86 Calabresi, supra note 54, at 1501.
87 Calabresi & H-irschoff, supra note 67, at 1081.
88 The Decision, supra note 5, at 715.
89 See discussion supra Part IF.
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method of accomplishing it would be through a system of general social
insurance. " 9° For enterprise liability scholars, however, compensation was not
the only goal of accident law; factors such as deterrence, administrative cost,
and political feasibility could point to no-fault or strict liability alternatives to
both fault and social insurance.91 Unlike Calabresi, the enterprise liability
scholars recognized that the strongest argument for such alternatives was the
goal of victim compensation. From the viewpoint of the enterprise liability
theory, it was a mistake to attempt to sever the strict liability and no-fault
agenda from that goal. And that mistake was especially unfortunate, since the
fault system would prove far more tenacious and the implications of economic
analysis would prove far more ambiguous than Calabresi and other scholars
assumed.
C. The Ascendancy of Economic Analysis and Its Opposition to the
Enterprise Liability Agenda
The antagonism between economic analysis and the enterprise liability
theory went largely unnoticed during the 1960s because, as presented by
Calabresi, economic analysis appeared to support the no-fault and strict liability
agenda of enterprise liability. For Calabresi, it will be recalled, the problem
with the fault system was that it "results in a deterrence of only faultily caused
accidents." 92 If conduct "is not deemed careless, then a system based on fault
... will have no effect whatever on this activity." 93 Based on this analysis, it
was commonly believed, as Marc Franklin wrote in 1972, that strict liability
could be justified on "safety incentive" grounds because if "forced to bear all
accident costs, the businessman will have an incentive to find the optimal
accident level for his product. "94
During the 1970s, however, Richard Posner forcefully challenged the view
that economic analysis pointed to strict liability. He noted that the negligence
90 The Decision, supra note 5, at 744 (emphasis added).
91 See EHRENzwEiG, supra note 26, at 1450-55 (strict liability); KARL N. .LEWELLYN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 341-42 (1930) (strict products liability);
SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at xviii, 3 (social insurance and expanded employee benefit
plans; skepticism about deterrent effect of tort law); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid"
Insurance for the Traffic Victim-A Voluntary Compensation Plan, 43 CAL. L. REv. 1, 24-
48 (1955) (automobile compensation plan); Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967) (social
insurance with safety incentives); James, supra note 21, at 924 (strict products liability);
James, supra note 36, at 413 (automobile compensation plans); Karl N. Liewellyn, On
Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699, 704 (1936) (strict products
liability); Expanding, supra note 25, at 771 (no-fault); Roger J. Traynor, 7he Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 366-76 (1965)
(strict liability, compensation plans).
92 The Decision, supra note 5, at 720.
93 Id. at 719 (footnote omitted).
94 Franklin, supra note 72, at 462 (footnote omitted).
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(Learned Hand) test imposes liability only when the potential accident cost
exceeds the cost of avoiding an accident. He conceded that if the accident cost
does not exceed the avoidance cost, the defendant would not be liable and "will
have no incentive to adopt preventive measures." 95 Posner's point, however,
was that under a strict liability rule, the defendant, although liable, "would
have no incentive to adopt precautions; it would prefer to pay a judgment cost
that by hypothesis would be lower than the cost of the precautions." 96 In other
words, contrary to the assumption of many, economic theory indicated that a
negligence rule would induce the same level of safety as strict liability. Posner
thus concluded that economic analysis failed to establish any reason to move
toward a regime of strict liability rules.97 And although Calabresi countered
that in practice, as opposed to theory, strict liability better optimized accident
costs, 98 Posner's retort was that Calabresi had established only that the
"question whether a general substitution of strict for negligence liability would
improve efficiency [is] at this stage hopelessly conjectural; the question is at
bottom empirical and the empirical work has not been done." 99 Posner thus
concluded that "[e]conomic theory provides no basis, in general, for preferring
strict liability to negligence, or negligence to strict liability.... Empirical data
might enable us to move beyond agnosticism but we do not have any." 1' °
If, as Posner argued, the deterrence goal provided no basis for preferring
strict liability to negligence, the enterprise liability theory did: strict liability
would provide an assurance of adequate compensation for victims of
nonnegligent accidents. During the 1970s, however, a revolution had occurred
in tort theory. At the start of the decade the enterprise liability theory had stood
at the forefront of tort theory, as strict products liability and no-fault auto
compensation plans achieved striking successes in courts and legislatures. As
we have discussed, however, the no-fault movement quickly took on a life of
its own as an alternative to "tort"-as opposed to a component of a broader
(enterprise liability) theory about the proper configuration of tort (personal
injury) law. Indeed, by the late 1970s the enterprise liability had become
obscured to the point that it had virtually disappeared from the scholarly
consciousness. Thus, advocates of compensation plans often painted with a
95 Posner, supra note 8, at 206.
96 Id. at 207 n.6.
97 See id. at 220-21.
98 See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 67, at 1059.
99 Posner, supra note 8, at 211-12.
100 Id. at 221; see 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3, at 263 ("efficient incentives for
accident avoidance flow from either [strict liability or negligence] standards"); Calabresi &
Klevorick, supra note 8, at 626 (need for empirically based reexamination); John P. Brown,
Toward an Economic 77eory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973) (both negligence
and strict liability with contributory fault defense lead to optimal levels of safety). As
subsequently pointed out by Steven Shavell, the issue is more complicated than had been
assumed because the number of accidents is a function not only of the level of care but also
of the amount of an activity that takes place-the activity level. See Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
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broad brush, attributing to "tort" the flaws of traditional tort law. Having
overlooked the common law agenda of enterprise liability, which included
damages reform, these advocates questioned compensation as a goal for "tort,"
even as they pursued it in their compensation plan proposals.
These developments coincided with Calabresi's rejection (for different
reasons) of the enterprise liability view that "compensation [is] the main
purpose of accident law." 10 1 Calabresi turned away from the "radical" 1° 2 loss
spreading policy in favor of a "more general[ ] justification" 10 3 for nonfault
liability rules. However, contrary to the initial suggestion of Calabresi's
pioneering work, the more general justification-economic analysis-failed to
provide the promised safe "middle ground" 104 that could support the nonfault
alternatives to negligence law that Calabresi favored. Although scholars could
still argue that strict liability is superior to negligence on economic grounds' 0 5
and no-fault (first- or third-party) could be defended on economic grounds, 10 6
those arguments lacked the certainty and forcefulness that they had appeared to
possess in the 1960s.
IV. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND CONTEMPORARY TORT THEORY
A. The Appropriate Goal of Personal Injury Law
By the time that the no-fault movement came to a standstill in the late
1970s, a revolution in tort theory had occurred, with economic analysis
capturing the central position held a decade earlier by the enterprise liability
theory. Indeed, the enterprise liability theory was in a shambles. Its common
law version, which linked the assurance of compensation with limitations on
damages, was virtually forgotten. No-fault insurance, in turn, was seen as an
alternative to tort, rather than an aspect of a broader (enterprise liability) theory
of tort law.
The state of contemporary tort theory was well captured in 1991 by the
American Law Institute's massive two-volume Reporters' Study on Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury, the product of a five-year collaboration by
fourteen distinguished scholars.' 0 7 According to that study, the consensus
among torts scholars by the late 1970s was that "the use of tort law as a device
for expanding insurance protection against disabling injuries is... a
101 The Decision, supra note 5, at 715.
102 Id. at 745.
103 Some Thoughts, supra note 5, at 501.
104 See The Decision, supra note 5, at 745.
105 See, e.g., 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 11, at 508. For a spirited defense of
absolute manufacturer liability on economic grounds, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 683 (1993).
106 See Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can
Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOwA L. REv. 833 (1984).
107 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3.
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questionable enterprise."' 08 Economic analysis, focused on "liability incentives
for the prevention of future injuries," in turn was seen as "the generally
prevailing scholarly theory about the appropriate role of tort law." 10 9
The consensus among torts scholars was that "efficient incentives for
accident avoidance flow from either [strict liability or negligence]
standards." 110  "]ooted... in the approaches and techniques of
contemporary legal scholarship,"111 the Reporters' Study reflects the contours
of modem tort theory, confirming the success of economic analysis in
displacing the enterprise liability theory.
Yet, as we have demonstrated, the approaches and techniques of
contemporary legal scholarship-including the Reporters' Study-are
fundamentally flawed in their (mis)understanding of the enterprise liability
theory. Thus, the Reporters' Study statement of the "appropriate role of tort
law" defines "tort" to exclude no-fault compensation plans and to include the
traditional damages award that enterprise liability scholars had criticized. 112
Yet both no-fault and damages reform were, for enterprise liability advocates,
central aspects of their theory, which defined the proper configuration of tort
(personal injury) law.
Paradoxically-and unwittingly-the Reporters' Study supports the view
that the enterprise liability theory is once again emerging as the generally
prevailing scholarly theory about the appropriate role of tort law. That study,
for example, endorses damages reforms that resemble those proposed by
enterprise liability scholars. 113 More fundamentally, when the study broadens
its focus from tort law (narrowly defined) to personal injury law generally, one
finds an endorsement of no-fault compensation plans, which are seen to provide
a "promising blend of efficient compensation, economical administration, and
effective prevention" of accidents.1 14 Building on the workers' compensation
(third-party liability) model, the study proposes an inventive no-fault
compensation plan for persons injured during medical treatment. 115 The study
thus follows the enterprise liability tradition of extending the workers'
compensation "pattern" to new accident settings. Indeed, the study endorses
"Jeffrey O'Connell's idea of elective no-fault as a possible way to [bring its
medical no-fault] on stream," 116 thus demonstrating that its proposal is a
derivative of O'Connell's elective no-fault proposals of the 1970s and 1980s
and an implementation of the enterprise liability theory.
108 Id. at30.
109 Id at 31-32.
110 Id. at 263.
111 Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1208
(1992).
112 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3, at 23-30; see also id. at 35 (no-fault seen as
"alternative to tort").
113 See 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 11, at 19-24 (damages proposals).
14 Id. at 534.
115 See id. at 487-516.
116 Id. at 513.
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The Reporters' Study can be faulted-indeed O'Connell has faulted it' 1 7 -
for its failure to propose further extensions of the workers' compensation
model. That failure, however, is due to the study's focus on product accidents
and its conclusion (which O'Connell questions) that the application of no-fault
liability to manufacturers is problematical. What is impressive is the
endorsement by the fourteen Reporters of the "promising blend of efficient
compensation, economical administration, and efficient [accident] prevention"
provided by the workers' compensation model.118 Taken as a whole, the
Reporters' Study supports the conclusion of Mark Rahdert's recent book on
insurance and tort law: while the attractiveness of the workers' compensation
model is apparent, the difficulty is "to find zones of human activity beyond the
workplace where such an approach might work."119 That, of course, was the
goal of enterprise liability scholars such as Leon Green. The Reporters' Study
thus is an endorsement of the enterprise liability theory as put forth by its
proponents.
Indeed, the Reporters' Study is symptomatic of the widespread appeal of
the workers' compensation (enterprise liability) model across the academic and
political spectrum. Stephen Sugarman, for example, believes it is "unlikely"
that tort law provides significant deterrence of accidents, 120 and he favors
replacing tort law with a system of social insurance and expanded employee
benefit plans. 121 Yet Sugarman also favors no-fault alternatives to tort,
including the Reporters' Study medical no-fault proposal. 122 Sugarman
recommends a "series of such schemes focusing on the seriously injured-say,
for victims of medical accidents, airplane accidents, prescription drug and
vaccine side-effects [and] organized recreational sporting accidents." 123
In contrast to Sugarman, Gary Schwartz has long been sympathetic to the
negligence system, 124 and he believes that tort law provides a moderate amount
of accident deterrence (although not as much as most economic analysts
assume). 12 Yet Schwartz appears to join Sugarman in endorsing compensation
plans based on the third-party liability model (workers' compensation is his
example). He writes that "the division of liability affected by workers'
117 See Jeffrey O'Connell & Chad M. Oldfather, A Lost Opportunity: A Review of the
American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury,
30 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 307 (1993).
118 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 11, at 534.
119 MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILrrY, AND
TORT REFORM 182 (1995).
12 0 See SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at 23.
121 See id. atxviii.
122 See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1499, 1524 (1991)
(reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991)).
123 Id. at 1525.
124 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability,
15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1981) (sympathetic toward negligence law).
125 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law. Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 423 (1994).
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compensation ... may achieve about as much by way of deterrence as any
other liability regime." 126 And he adds that the worker compensation approach
"eliminates the need to expensively litigate issues such as negligence and
contributory negligence. Also, it satisfies injured workers' basic insurance
needs." 127
Further across the ideological spectrum is Peter Huber, a strident
conservative critic of modem tort law and an avowed advocate of a
"rediscovered respect for contract." 128 Huber, however, also emerges as a
proponent of no-fault (enterprise) liability in the form of O'Connell-inspired
"neo-no-fault" schemes in which compensation "is severed from questions of
negligence, defect or fault" and under which benefits would "not include open-
ended damages for pain and suffering." 129 Huber would adapt contract law to
prescribe how "reasonable compensation for well-defined contingencies could
best be expedited."' 30 Reminiscent of Leon Green, who thought the
"possibilities [were] many"' 3 ' for areas in which compensation plans might
displace tort, Huber writes that there are "many possible arrangements," and
he suggests the application of no-fault principles to airline crashes, 132 as well as
"lawn mowers, drugs, medical care, and countless other goods and
services." 133
A similar range of support can be found for automobile no-fault plans-
despite their being held hostage since the mid-1970s by special interest politics.
An "early and influential legislative supporter of no-fault insurance" in
Massachusetts, the first state to enact an auto no-fault plan, was Michael
Dukakis who later was to be George Bush's 1988 opponent for the
presidency.' 34 In his 1992 bid for re-election, President Bush made an
O'Connell-inspired no-fault insurance proposal a facet of his campaign,
proposing federal legislation that would require states to give drivers an
elective no-fault option.' 35 Also, auto no-fault has been championed by the
conservative Manhattan Institute, as well as by persons whose ties have been to
the Consumer Movement.' 36
12 6 Id. at 430.
127 Id. at n.261.
12 8 PEER W. HUBER, LIABn LrrY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
203 (1988).
129 Id. at 194, 196.
130 Id. at 194.
131 Green, supra note 12, at 270.
132 HUBER, supra note 128, at 194.
133 Id. at 197.
134 See O'CONNELL, supra note 40, at 209.
135 See Peter Passel, Bush's Bold Plan for Car Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1992,
at A41.
136 See id.; Michael Johnson et al., A New, No-Fault Road Map to Auto Insurance
Reform, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1995, at B5.
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B. Understanding and Implementing the Enterprise Liability Theory
If we are correct that a broad spectrum of informed scholarly, and other,
opinion would favor the sort of no-fault alternatives to traditional tort law
endorsed by Sugarman, Schwartz, Huber, Rahdert, and the fourteen American
Law Institute (ALl) Reporters, then the misunderstanding of the enterprise
liability theory by contemporary torts scholars is especially unfortunate.
Because they fail to recognize no-fault as a branch of a broader enterprise
liability theory relating to the proper configuration of tort (personal injury) law,
these scholars limit the role of "tort" law to the creation of "liability incentives
for the prevention of future injuries." 137 Negligence law may achieve this goal
(as does strict liability), but no one would claim that negligence law also gives
the "promising blend of efficient compensation [and] economical
administration" 138 that no-fault provides in addition to effective accident
prevention. Because contemporary scholars give up the quest for this
(enterprise liability) blend of goals, tort law and tort theory are impoverished.
These scholars assume that courts are incapable of creating a system of
personal injury law that incorporates the insights of compensation plan
scholarship. The ALl Reporters and others assume, for example, that courts are
"stuck with the administrative apparatus of tort law [and its traditional] rules of
damages." 139 They overlook the fact that no-fault compensation plans and
damages reform are a product of the enterprise liability theory, which sought a
system of personal injury law that provides the assurance of adequate (but not
undue) compensation.
By ignoring the possibility of courts creating a balanced system of
enterprise (no-fault) liability, contemporary scholars are left with legislatures as
the focus of their reform efforts. In our view, this is a profound mistake.
Desirable as no-fault may be, with the exception of workers' compensation and
the flurry of auto no-fault enactments in the early 1970s, no-fault proposals
have been blocked throughout this century by the clash of special interests that
has paralyzed the legislative process.
In this regard the fate of the Reporters' Study is instructive. While
O'Connell registered his disappointment over the meager no-fault agenda of the
study, 140 the study's proposals apparently were too radical for its sponsor, the
ALl. To the great dismay of its authors, the ALI did not even bring the
Reporters' Study to the floor for a vote, much less endorse its
recommendations. 14 1 In a recent symposium assessing the Reporters' Study,
three of the Reporters, including Chief Reporter Paul Weiler, wrote that "after
listening to intense exchanges between members of the plaintiff and defense
137 1 REPoRTERs' STUDY, supra note 3, at 31.
138 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 11, at 534.
139 SUGARMAN, supra note 44, at 36; see also 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 3, at
30.
140 See O'Connell & Oldfather, supra note 117, at 329.
141 Note from the Editors, The American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on
Enterprise Responsibilityfor Personal Injury, 30 SAN DEGo L. REv. 371, 371 (1993).
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bars at its annual meeting in 1991, the ALI's Council decided to duck the
fundamental policy questions we had raised about reforming tort litigation."142
Instead, the ALI decided to devote its resources to a Restatement (Third) of
Products Liability.143 The Reporters editorialize that if "an organization like
the [ALI] could be paralyzed by internal divisions . . . one cannot help
wondering whether even more substantial reforms [along the lines urged by
O'Connell] have any chance of adoption in the current climate." 144
The Reporters' pessimism over the prospects for legislative reform is
supported by events in California in the late 1980s. In California, as in many
states, auto no-fault plans have for years been blocked by the plaintiffs' bar. 145
The stalemate over no-fault, however, is part of a broader phenomenon in
which powerful interests, including insurers, hospitals, doctors, municipal
governments, manufacturers, consumers groups, and trial lawyers have brought
the legislative process to a standstill. As a consequence, in the 1980s, these
groups shifted their efforts to the initiative process. 146 In the fall of 1988, for
example, voters faced a dizzying array of competing tort reform, no-fault, and
insurance reform ballot initiatives put forward by the insurance industry,
plaintiffs' lawyers, and consumer groups. 147 The battle of the initiatives cost
$83 million-an "orgy of spending" that exceeded "the entire 1984 presidential
election cost." 148 These events indicate a legislative process paralyzed by the
clash of well-financed special interest groups and bode ill for the legislative
enactment of any form of enterprise liability.
The legislative stalemate in California and the fate of the ALI Reporters'
Study demonstrate, once again, that it is a fundamental mistake to assume that
carefully crafted academic proposals for comprehensive alternatives to tort will
necessarily achieve legislative success. In the 1950s, James asked one "final
question[:] whether we would be better served in the long run by a process of
common law development.., than by a compensation scheme." 149 Answering
this question in terms of the ideal, James concluded that "[u]nless it can be
shown that common law development can produce a prompt, widespread, and,
above all, equitable distribution of payments in accident cases, it should be
142 Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further
Reflecions, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 333, 333 (1993). See generally Symposium,
Perspetives on the American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility
for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 213 (1993).
143 See Abraham, supra note 142, at 347 n.30.
144 Id. at364.
145 See Reynolds Holding, High Stakes Battle Over No-Fault, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, July 9, 1991, at Al.
146 See Stephen D. Sugarman, California's Insurance Regulation Revolution: The First
Two Years ofProposition 103,27 SANDIEGoL. REv. 683,683 (1990).
147 See id. at 687-9 1.
148 A Crying, Lying Shame, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1988, at B4; see also Kenneth Reich,
Insurance Fight Cost Initiative Backers a Total of $83.9 Million, L.A. TMES, Feb. 7, 1989, at
A3.
149 James, supra note 36, at 424.
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replaced by a statutory scheme of compensation for automobile accidents." 150
Similarly, Green wrote that an ideal solution to the accident compensation
problem would require "[s]omething more than merely polishing up the
common law techniques." 51 But, as the fate of the Columbia Plan and the
Keeton-O'Connell efforts demonstrates, we live in a political, not an ideal,
world. Each of these efforts was a model for responsible tort reform-a
comprehensive scholarly examination of a discrete problem followed by a
concrete legislative proposal. Moreover, Keeton and O'Connell expressly
sought to infuse their proposal with political insights derived from the failure of
the Columbia Plan. Today, however, even sympathetic observers note that the
no-fault movement has been stalled for two decades, and that most of the
adopted plans "are far from [the] ideal .... In all too many'places, no-fault
benefits are meager in amount, and worse, hardly any tort law has actually
been displaced."' 52 Thus, in fact, as opposed to theory, the no-fault movement
has failed to produce prompt, widespread, and equitable distribution of
payments in the bulk of the nation's automobile accidents, let alone in the
broader array of situations envisioned by the enterprise liability theory. Today
one could ask: unless it can be shown that legislative compensation plans have
political viability, should not courts and scholars explore common law routes to
assure prompt, widespread, and above all, equitable distribution of payments in
accidental injury cases?
V. COMMON LAW ROUTES TO ENTERPRISE (NO-FAULT) LIABILIY
Given the troubled prospects for more comprehensive legislative reform, it
is time, in our view, once again to seriously consider the common law route to
the goals of enterprise liability. In doing so, it is important to recall the
compensation plan origins of the enterprise liability theory. The goal should be
to incorporate insights of the no-fault compensation plans in order to avoid the
problematic aspects of the strict products liability form of the enterprise liability
theory, namely the defect requirement and traditional damages rules. As we
have discussed, damages reform was an (uncompleted) aspect of the enterprise
liability agenda. Thus, to craft a common law version of the enterprise liability
theory, courts should reexamine the traditional damages award, as they create
common law rules that dispense with the defect requirement.
Once one recognizes the compensation plan origins of the enterprise
liability theory, it becomes apparent that the defect requirement is not integral
to the enterprise liability theory and, in fact, is an impediment to the
achievement of the goals of that theory. In fact, early in the history of strict
products liability, Justice Traynor advised that the "complications surrounding
the definition of defect suggest inquiry as to whether defectiveness is the
150 Id. (footnote omitted).
151 Green, supra note 13, at 775.
152 Stephen D. Sugarman, Foreword: Choosing Among Systemis of Auto Insurance for
Personal Injury, 26 SAN DI.GoL. REv. 977, 977 (1989).
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appropriate touchstone of liability." 153 In our view, it is time for courts to
explore the possibility of a strict liability that does not require defectiveness as
a prerequisite to victim compensation.
We are mindful that Professors Henderson and Twerski, Reporters for the
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability, have recently asserted that the
"abandonment of the traditional defect requirement... is one significant step
in the evolution of American products liability that our courts will never
take." 154 They point to the fact that in many accidents more than one product is
causally involved. This raises the problem of how to allocate liability among
automobile, truck, bicycle, and telephone pole manufacturers in an accident
involving all of these products. 155 The enterprise liability answer is that
Henderson, Twerski, and others focus too narrowly on the existing doctrine of
strict products liability. A broader focus would reveal that courts can craft a
common law enterprise liability that eliminates the defect requirement, while
also avoiding the multiple-product problem. In fact, two distinct doctrinal
sources are available for use by courts in creating a new enterprise liability.
First, the strict products liability doctrine has been applied to business
premises whose activities fall within the "license to use" and "hybrid sales-
service" categories of strict products liability. 156 Thus, strict liability applies to
a laundromat whose washing machine malfunctions' 57 or to a beauty parlor that
applies a defective permanent wave solution to a patron.' 58 It would seem a
small step to apply a broader business premises strict liability to cases that fail
to fit precisely into the "license to use" and "hybrid sales-service" categories.
Thus, courts could easily recognize a doctrine of business premises enterprise
liability, applicable to persons injured on the premises of supermarkets and
laundromats, as well as department stores, restaurants, and similar
establishments. In contrast to strict products liability and previous proposals to
extend "strict" liability, victim compensation under our proposed doctrine
would not turn on whether an enterprise's premises could be characterized as
"dangerously defective." Instead, the proposed doctrine would impose a strict
enterprise liability for personal injuries arising out of the use of business
premises by entrants on those premises.
A second doctrinal source for a new enterprise liability, the hazardous
activity strict liability doctrine, already dispenses with the defect requirement.
The growth of this doctrine has been inhibited by the Restatement of Torts and
the Restatement (Second) of Toils, which preclude the application of strict
153 Traynor, supra note 91, at 372.
15 4 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Cosing the American Products
Liability Frontier: 7he Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263,
1329-30 (1991).
155 See iL at 1280.
156 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 719 (5th
ed. 1984).
157 See Garcia v. Halsett, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (Ct. App. 1970).
158 See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (NJ. 1969).
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liability to hazardous activities that are "a matter of common usage." 159
Nevertheless, courts have increasingly ignored this criterion while imposing
strict liability on such diverse (and common) activities as oil drilling,160
fumigation, 161 crop dusting, 162 hauling of fuel by tanker trucks, 163 and the
storage of gasoline by service stations in underground tanks164-activities that
create hazards unlike those routinely created by individual citizens pursuing
their everyday activities. 165
This case law could easily provide the precedent for a broader enterprise
liability. Courts, for example, might impose strict liability on railroads for
injuries occurring when trains collide with persons or vehicles at crossings or
elsewhere and when train derailments cause injuries to passengers or
bystanders. In Siegler v. Kuhlman, the Washington Supreme Court applied
strict liability to a trucker whose gasoline trailer overturned and exploded. 166 It
would be no stretch to move from Siegler to railroad strict liability. Indeed,
railroading clearly meets the criterion for liability that is emerging in the case
law. Like the commercial hauling of fuel, railroading creates hazards unlike
those routinely created by individual citizens pursuing their everyday
activities. 167
159 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(b) (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 520(d) (1977).
160 See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
161 See Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 6-8 (Cal. 1948).
162 See Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567
P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977).
163 See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
164 See City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo.
1981).165 See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity
Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257, 299 (1987). Courts have rejected the Restatement's
restrictions on strict liability and have articulated their own criteria to guide future
applications of strict liability to hazardous activities. They have considered the loss
spreading capacity of the enterprise and whether the activity is a "commercial hazard"
when applying strict liability to hazardous activities. See id.
166 See Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1181.
167 One reason for our selection of business premises and railway accidents is that we
believe that no-falt enterprise liability can be readily adapted to these factual contexts. Far
more complex issues arise in toxic, environmental, and mass torts; and Jeffrey O'Connell
has recently cautioned that it "puts the cart before the horse... to tackle [these]
... incalculably more complex and unknowable" problems, as opposed to the problems
posed by "simple traumatic injuries such as those from malfunctioning products."
O'Connell & Oldfather, supra note 140, at 328. Also, business premises and railway
accidents are unlikely to be the source of "outrageous misconduct" that could justify calling
forth the expensive and complex machinery of traditional tort law to unearth the sort of
misconduct that characterized the asbestos industry. See David Rosenberg, The Dusting of
America: The Story of Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1693 (1986) (reviewing PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)). These accident settings are, in short, more akin to routine
traffic accidents than to toxic, environmental, or mass torts-or even to injuries occurring
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Because defectiveness is not a prerequisite to compensation, each of our
proposed versions of enterprise liability avoids the "nettlesome" problems
associated with the defect requirement of strict products liability.1 68 Moreover,
our proposed doctrines also avoid the multiple product problem. Like workers'
compensation plans and auto no-fault, they look to the specified activity or
locus of the accident to allocate no-fault enterprise liability. The owners of a
railroad or a supermarket (or their insurer), for example, would compensate a
person injured even if several products are causally related to the injury.
Business premises and railway accidents may be a more fertile ground for a
no-fault enterprise liability than products cases for another reason. In
explaining its hesitancy to extend no-fault to consumer products (at least
outside such specialized situations as prescription drugs), the ALI Reporters'
Study warns that there is
a crucial difference between the consumer product situation and the workplace
and health care settings .... In the latter contexts, the employer or the
hospital that is made liable has ample control over the circumstances giving rise
to the injury and is able to investigate quickly both the causes and effects of
any injuries that occur. 169
In the product context, in contrast, once a product has "left the hands of the
manufacturer, the consumer is in control ... and is unconstrained ... by the
manufacturer ... in the risky use ... of the product." 170 Furthermore, "the
manufacturer has no ability to investigate what kinds or causes of injuries may
have occurred until compensation claims are filed much later." 171 Business
premises and railway accidents are suitable for the application of no-fault
principles because, like the workplace and health care situations, the business
or railroad has "control over the circumstances giving rise to the injury and is
able to investigate quickly both the causes and effects of any accidents that
occur."
1 7 2
Since our proposed doctrines are cast in a no-fault mode, it would also
make sense to eliminate defenses based on victim fault. The early enterprise
liability precedent for eliminating these defenses is, of course, workers'
compensation; and the inappropriateness of these defenses was recognized by
during medical treatment. It should also be noted that the adoption of an enterprise liability
approach would not necessarily preclude the retention of a residual cause of action for what
Ehrenzweig called "reprehensible conduct," under which traditional damages would be
awarded. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 26, at 1428. Once adopted, these doctrines could, of
course, serve as a "pattern," Green, supra note 12, at 270, for other applications of the
enterprise liability principle.
168 See JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW op PREMisEs LIABILrrY, § 6.9, at 142 (2d ed.
1988).
169 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 11, at 528.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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James in the 1950s 73 and O'Connell in the 1970s. 174 As the ALI Reporters'
Study has recently reiterated, "little incentive to take care is lost when a patient
(or worker or consumer) [or persons injured on a business premise or by a
railroad] is told that even though he might suffer a painful, perhaps even fatal
injury, he or his surviving dependents will be able to recover compensation for
the losses." 175
Because our proposed doctrine provides an assurance of compensation, it
should, as suggested by Justice Traynor, be accompanied by "curbs on such
potentially inflationary damages as those for pain and suffering. Otherwise the
cost of assured compensation could become prohibitive." 176 The substantive
premises have long been in place for the judicial reform of damages law. In
1977, for example, the California Supreme Court in Borer v. American
Airlines, Inc. 177 wrote of the "strong policy reasons" that argue against
compensation of "intangible, nonpecuniary lOss." 178 Such losses were seen as
"difficult to measure," and the court wrote that they "can never be
compensated" by money damages. 179 Moreover, "the burden of payment
... must be borne by the public generally in increased insurance premiums or,
otherwise, in the enhanced danger that accrues from the greater number of
people who may choose to go without any insurance." 180 These policy
considerations, of course, support limitations on the award of pain and
suffering damages, as well as the elimination of the collateral source rule.
In their consideration of the proper measurement of damages in this new
enterprise liability, courts could examine the array of approaches suggested by
the enterprise liability scholars in the 1950s and early 1960s, 181 as well as
more recent proposals by O'Connell and others. 182 O'Connell has proposed
that courts simply abolish the award for pain and suffering, as well as the
collateral source rule, while making an explicit award of attorneys' fees.183
This proposal has the merit of a clean solution, clearly crafted along no-fault
lines.
Of course, courts might be reluctant to make such an abrupt change in
settled damages law, although this might be overcome by the fact that this
173 See Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law, 63 HARV. L. Rnv. 769, 780 (1950).
174 See Compensatory, supra note 33.
175 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 11, at 511.
176 Traynor, supra note 91, at 376 (footnote omitted).
177 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977).
17 8 Id. at 862.
179 Id.
18 0 Id.
181 See NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 12, at 106-15.
182 See 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 11, at 159-316; Randall R. Bovbjerg et al.,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908,
938-65 (1989); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private
Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1984).
183 See Compensatory, supra note 33, at 591; Payment, supra note 33.
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change accompanies a liability rule that assures compensation in this category
of accidents. Courts might prefer, however, to formulate their new damages
rule in Louis Jaffe's terms, stating as a guideline that "the award for pain and
suffering ... be measured and justified in terms of a contribution to the real
costs of the litigation." 184 Or courts might prefer, at least initially, to adopt
Justice Traynor's rule of thumb that "ordinarily the part of the verdict
attributable to pain and suffering does not exceed the part attributable to
pecuniary losses."' 85 This approach, in fact, would provide for attorneys' fees,
while decreasing the amount of litigation sparked by uncertainty regarding the
size of pain and suffering awards. 186 Each of these approaches would, as James
urged, recognize "within the framework of common law development.., the
need for ... progressively adopting a functional view of the amounts to be
recovered."1 87
Our conclusion is that our proposed enterprise liability doctrines can be
achieved by courts operating "well within the framework of our common law
tradition"188-by courts elaborating upon and refining the enterprise liability
premises embedded in the tort law of the past three decades. The proposed
doctrines thus provide a means for courts to meet James's 1959 challenge for
"common law development [that] produce[s] a prompt, widespread, and, above
all, equitable distribution of payment in accident cases." 189 Moreover,
precisely because the proposals add to common law precedent the insights of
no-fault compensation plans, they also offer the "promising blend of efficient
compensation, economical administration, and effective prevention" 190 that has
recommended no-fault plans from workers' compensation to the recent ALl
Reporters' Study medical no-fault proposal.
184 laffe, supra note 27, at 235.
185 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 346 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
186 As courts seek to define what cases would not be governed by Justice Traynor's
"ordinarily" qualifier, damages law might evolve in the direction of guidelines based on
profiles of various types of accidents and appropriate awards. For a succinct discussion of
the possibility of scheduling pain and suffering awards, see 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra
note 11, at 33. See also Bovbjerg, supra note 182, at 937; Danzon, supra note 182.
187 James, supra note 32, at 585.
188 James, supra note 21, at 924.
189 James, supra note 36, at 424.
190 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 11, at 534. See also Schwartz, supra note 125, at
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